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Message Text

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PBOR, PGOV, JO, PLO, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AND JORDAN

SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE ATTEMPTS TO STATE AND ANALYZE ASSUMPTIONS AND SUGGEST OPTIONS REGARDING THE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA. WE ASSUME THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE REPRESENTED AT GENEVA, THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT PLO DELEGATION (AND POSSIBLY NO PLO REPRESENTATION AT ALL) AND THAT--BETWEEN THESE TWO POLES--THE U.S. MUST TRY TO BEGIN TO FORM ON THIS VISIT AN ARAB CONSENSUS ON THE REPRESENTATION QUESTION TO WHICH BOTH ISRAEL AND THE PLO WOULD EVENTUALLY BE ABLE TO ACQUIESCE OR BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT. THE THREE OPTIONS WE SEE WORTHY OF DISCUSSION WITH THE ARABS ARE: (A) A "PROXY" OPTION: PLO AGREES TO OR ACQUIESCES IN DESIGNATION OF JORDAN, EGYPT, SYRIA OR AN INDIVIDUAL OF THOSE COUNTRIES' DELEGATIONS TO REPRESENT IT, WITH NO ATTEMPT TO HAVE ANY ETHNIC PALESTINIANS DIRECTLY REPRESENTING IT AT GENEVA; (B) THE SURROGATE OPTION: NON-PLO PALESTINIANS (FROM THE WEST AND EAST BANKS) AS A "PALESTINIAN"
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DELEGATION OR AS PART OF A UNIFIED OR EGYPTIAN, JORDANIAN, OR EVEN SYRIAN DELEGATION TO DO THE NEGOTIATING. "IF THE PLO REPRESENTS THE PALESTINIANS, WHY CAN'T PALESTINIANS REPRESENT THE PLO?" (THIS IS THE OPTION FAVORED BY JORDAN--PARTICULARLY THROUGH A UNITED ARAB DELEGATION). (C) A METAMORPHIC OPTION: THE PLO MAKES A DRASTIC CHANGE IN ITS IDEAS

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(ACCEPTS ISRAEL AND 242) AND IN ITS REPRESENTATIVES (SENDS ONLY MODERATE CRYPTO-PLO TYPES AND/OR PLO SYMPATHIZERS). (ALTHOUGH THE LEAST LIKELY OPTION NOW, A PLO METAMORPHOSIS COULD WELL EMERGE AT THE END OF A DYNAMIC NEGOTIATING PROCESS). WE CAN VENTURE FEW PREDICTIONS ON WHICH OPTION THE ARAB (AND THEN THE ISRAELI) CONSENSES WOULD SETTLE, BUT ALL OPTIONS ASSUME ULTIMATELY SOME ASSOCIATION OR LINK WITH JORDAN AT SOME POINT EARLY IN NEGOTIATIONS. A CENTRAL PART OF OUR STRATEGY IN JORDAN IS TO OUTLINE TO GOJ FULLY AND CANDIDLY OUR ULTIMATE INTENTIONS AND ULTIMATE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES AND FIND OUT WHAT THEY WANT FROM US IN RETURN FOR PLAYING A ROLE IN THE LINKAGE (E.G., USE OF OUR INFLUENCE WITH OTHER ARABS TO ENSURE SUPPORT FOR JORDAN'S ROLE; AGREEMENT TO RESPECT JORDAN'S SEPARATE SOVEREIGN EXISTENCE; ADDITIONAL POLITICAL, MILITARY OR ECONOMIC SUPPORT; AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT JORDANIAN HEGEMONY ON THE WEST BANK). IF WE FAIL AND NO PALESTINIAN OPTION IS FEASIBLE, WE SEE LITTLE HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY

1. TO PREPARE FOR YOUR TRIP TO THE AREA, WE HAVE LOOKED AT A KEY ISSUE--PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION--FROM THE JORDANIAN PERSPECTIVE. ON ANY QUESTION AS DELICATE AS THIS, WE BELIEVE OUR ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS COULD BENEFIT FROM COMMENT AND CRITICISM

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OF OTHERS AND WOULD WELCOME SUCH.

2. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS: WE BELIEVE THERE ARE A NUMBER OF BASIC ASSUMPTIONS WHICH CAN BE STATED AT THE OUTSET:

(A) PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AND A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION ARE DIRECTLY LINKED. PROCEDURE INFLUENCES SUBSTANCE. THE CONFIGURATION OF WHO NEGOTIATES WILL HELP CONSIDERABLY TO DETERMINE WHO GETS POWER;

(B) THE ISSUE MUST BE WORKED OUT BEFORE GENEVA CAN BEGIN. THE ARABS CANNOT GO TO GENEVA WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO POINT TO SOME SATISFACTION OF THEIR MINIMUM POSITION THAT THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE SOMEHOW REPRESENTED. THIS ISSUE CANNOT BE FINESSED WITH MIXED COMMISSIONS OR PROXIMITY TALKS;

(C) ISRAEL WILL NOT ACCEPT PLO REPRESENTATIVES AS SUCH IN AN INDEPENDENT DELEGATION, AND POSSIBLY NOT AS SO IDENTIFIED IN A UNIFIED ARAB OR SEPARATE ARAB NATIONAL DELEGATION;

(D) THERE IS NO STRONG PUBLIC SENTIMENT IN THE U.S. FOR GIVING THE PLO A ROLE OR SPECIAL PLACE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE PLO DOES NOT

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OFFICIALLY ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL OR UNSC
RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.
INDEED, EVEN IF THE PLO ACCEPTED THESE POINTS IT IS
PROBLEMATIC IN OUR JUDGMENT WHETHER U.S. PUBLIC OPINION
WOULD CHANGE. THERE IS SOMEWHAT MORE SYMPATHY FOR THE PALESTINIANS
AS A DISPLACED GROUP WHICH SEEKS RIGHTS AND A HOME-
LAND;
(E) THE ARABS WILL NOT REVISE THE RABAT SUMMIT
DECISION, BUT THEY MIGHT ALLOW OTHER FORMULATIONS
TO SUPERVENE. THE PLO WILL NOT REVISE ITS NATIONAL
COVENANT. THE PLO PROBABLY CANNOT OR WILL NOT NOW OR SOON,
ACCEPT ISRAEL AND 242/338 AS A PRECONDITION FOR GOING TO
GENEVA;

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(F) THE U.S. PROBABLY CANNOT, EVEN OVER TIME,
CHANGE THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PLO IN ANY-
THING LIKE THE PRESENT CONFIGURATION OF THAT BODY;
(G) THE MAJOR ARAB STATES--EGYPT, SYRIA AND TO
SOME EXTENT SAUDI ARABIA SUPPORTING THEM--WILL PLACE
THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN RECOVERING THEIR
OWN TERRITORY (SINAI AND GAZA) AHEAD OF PLO INTERESTS IN
ACHIEVING THE RIGHT TO GOVERN OR CONTROL A STATE IN
THE WEST BANK-GAZA AREA. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THEY
WOULD BE VERY UNLIKELY TO DO SO AHEAD AH#MAJOR
"PALESTINIAN INTERESTS" AS ENDING THE ISRAELI
OCCUPATION AND ACHIEVING A NATIONAL IDENTITY AND
STATUS OF THEIR OWN. THUS WHEN FACED WITH A QUESTION
OF TERRITORY OR THE PLO, THE EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS
WOULD CHOOSE GETTING THEIR OWN TERRITORY BACK ABOVE WAITING
FOR THE PLO, SO LONG AS "SOMETHING" IN TERMS OF STATUS AND

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TERRITORY IS DONE FOR PALESTINIANS AS A WHOLE AS OPPOSED TO THE PLO.

(H) THE WEST BANKERS FAVOR THE PLO, BUT ARE NOT NECESSARILY CONVINCED THAT ARAFAT AND THE PLO, AS OPPOSED TO THEIR OWN LEADERS, SHOULD EMERGE TO RULE THAT STATE. THEY PROBABLY PREFER FULL INDEPENDENCE, BUT COULD BE RECONCILED TO SOME LOOSE

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ARRANGEMENT WITH JORDAN.

(I) ISRAEL (BEGIN GOVERNMENT) IS AGAINST THE RETURN OF TERRITORY ON THE WEST BANK, AND TO THE EXTENT THAT ANY CHANGE IN THE SITUATION IN THE WEST BANK COULD BE CONTEMPLATED IT WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE WITH JORDAN NOT THE PLO PLAYING A DOMINANT ROLE. THE MORE DOMINANT JORDAN'S ROLE, THE MORE LIKELY THAT ISRAELIS WOULD BE WILLING TO AT LEAST CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME, EVEN MINIMAL CHANGE (I.E., "FUNCTIONAL" APPROACH).

(J) THE MINIMUM DEMANDS OF THE PALESTINIANS ARE PROBABLY (IN ORDER OF PRIORITY) REMOVAL OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION, ESTABLISHMENT OF A HOMELAND (NATIONAL IDENTITY, FLAG, PASSPORT, ETC.) AND FULL INDEPENDENCE. ALL BUT THE LATTER CONSIDERATION COULD BE SATISFIED IN SOME FORM OF ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN. THE MINIMUM DEMANDS OF THE PLO INCLUDE ALL OF THE ABOVE PLUS PLO LEADERSHIP (CONTROL) OVER WHATEVER STATE EMERGES. THE "PALESTINIANS," AS OPPOSED TO THE PLO, ARE A LOOSE, AMORPHOUS UNORGANIZED GROUP WITH VARYING IDEAS AND NO PRESENT LEADERSHIP TO SPEAK OF. THE ARABS THAT COUNT(EGYPT AND SYRIA) MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT THE FIRST TWO MINIMUM DEMANDS OF THE PALESTINIANS, AS OPPOSED TO THOSE OF THE PLO, IN EXCHANGE FOR STRONG AND ACTIVE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THEM IN NEGOTIATIONS ON TERRITORY.

(K) JORDAN BELIEVES IT CANNOT PLAY A COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT ROLE. ITS POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD, IMPORTANT FOR ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SURVIVAL, WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED BY ITS MOVING OUT AHEAD OF AN ARAB CONSENSUS ON ITS OWN, BOTH ON PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE. JORDAN LOOKS TO THE U.S. TO BE A CATALYST FOR SUCH AN ARAB CONSENSUS. IT KNOWS THAT ITS OWN

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PARTICIPATION IS A KEY TO A FUTURE ROLE. THE REGIME WOULD LIKE TO PLAY SUCH A ROLE, BUT NOT AT THE

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EXPENSE OF ITS SURVIVAL. IT AT A MINIMUM WISHES TO
KNOW WHAT THE U.S. SEES AND WILL FIGHT FOR IN TERMS
OF THE END POINT OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT WILL NOT BECOME
A DEMANDEUR AND IN THE LONG RUN WILL CONTINUE A "TAKE-
IT-OR-LEAVE-IT" POLICY ON THE WEST BANK AND STICK
WITH THAT POLICY AS LONG AS IT FEELS THE "PIECES
HAVE NOT BEEN PUT IN PLACE" BY THE U.S. TO PERMIT
IT, OR PERSUADE IT (JORDAN) TO PLAY SUCH A ROLE.
(WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE ASSUMPTIONS ABOVE ARE THE SUBJECTS
THEMSELVES OF A GREAT DEAL OF ANALYSIS AND DIFFERENCES.
TO SAVE SPACE OUR ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN TRUNCATED INTO
THE STATEMENT OF THE ASSUMPTION. WE HAVE, HOWEVER,
STATED THE ASSUMPTIONS AS CAREFULLY AS WE CAN,
RECOGNIZING THEY ARE HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL. INDEED, WE
HOPE TO PROVOKE COMMENT AND OTHER JUDGMENTS IN DOING
SO.)

3. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES: AGAINST SUCH A BACK-
GROUND WE SEE SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES EMERGING FOR
SOLUTION OF THE REPRESENTATION ISSUE, KEEPING IN
MIND THAT THE SOLUTION IS SEEN BY ALL PARTIES AS
BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE, HAVING BOTH
TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF GREAT IMPORT.
A CENTRAL IDEA OF THIS MESSAGE IS THAT THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS
MAY NOT BE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE, AND THAT A SEQUENTIAL
USE OF SOME OF THE OPTIONS MIGHT ALSO OFFER A
SOLUTION THROUGH THE DYNAMICS OF NEGOTIATING
PROCESS. WE RULE OUT INITIALLY THE POSSIBILITIES
AT EITHER END OF THE SPECTURM--GENEVA WITHOUT SOME
PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION (UNACCEPTABLE TO THE
ARABS PROBABLY TO THE POINT WHERE THEY COULD NOT NOW OR SOON
COME TO GENEVA OR TO ANY OTHER NEGOTIATION WHERE
"SOMETHING" WAS NOT DONE FOR THE PALESTINIANS) AND
GENEVA WITH A SEPARATE, INDEPENDENT, PLO DELEGATION
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(CLEARLY RULED OUT BY THE ISRAELIS IN ALL CON-
CEIVABLE NEGOTIATING CONTEXTS). WHAT ARE THE
OPTIONS?

4. THE PROXY OPTION: IN SIMPLEST TERMS, THE PLO
WOULD STAY OUT BUT WOULD BE PERSUADED TO
AGREE BY THE OTHER ARABS, PERHAPS AT THE COST TO
THE U.S. OF A DIALOGUE WITH IT OF SOME SORT, TO
DESIGNATE JORDAN, OR EGYPT OR GENERAL GAMASY, AS
SADAT APPARENTLY SUGGESTED, TO REPRESENT IT.

NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED.

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AGREEMENT ("LINKS WITH JORDAN") MIGHT BE REACHED ON NEGOTIATING GOALS IN ADVANCE BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE PROXY. IN ADDITION, THE PLO MIGHT KEEP AN ADVISORY GROUP IN GENEVA TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS OR NEGOTIATING ADVICE TO THE PROXY. THIS APPROACH WOULD MEET MINIMUM ARAB DEMANDS IF IT SATISFIED THE PLO. IT IS NOT CERTAIN THE PLO WOULD LIKE IT AT ALL. ISRAELI VIEWS ARE UNKNOWN, BUT BEGIN WOULD PROBABLY BALK ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE WAS REALLY NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO NOT JORDAN OR EGYPT. JORDAN WOULD NOT BE HAPPY WITH THIS ROLE WHICH WOULD PROBABLY ENTANGLE IT WITH THE PLO AND COULD CONCEIVABLY LEAVE IT "HOLDING THE BAG" IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. THE SURROGATE OPTION: THIS WOULD INTRODUCE PALESTINIANS TO NEGOTIATE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FROM AMONG GROUPS NOT COMPRISING THE PLO NOR COMPROMISED BY HAVING BEEN OFFICIALLLY AND CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH IT. THEY MIGHT WELL COME FROM THE WEST BANK, THE EAST BANK AND THE OTHER AREAS OF THE PALESTINIAN DIASPORA. THEY MIGHT COME AS A DELEGATION; THEY MIGHT SIT AS PART OF ANOTHER ARAB DELEGATION OR A UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION. THE CHOICE

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OF WHO TO BRING AND HOW TO GET THEM THERE WOULD NOT

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BE EASY. THE FORMULA THAT "IF THE PLO REPRESENTS
ALL THE PALESTINIANS, THEN WHY CAN'T PALESTINIANS
REPRESENT THE PLO" MIGHT BE USEFUL IN TALKING TO
THE ARABS ABOUT THIS ALTERNATIVE. IT WOULD NOT GO
FAR WITH THE PLO. BEGIN HAS SAID HE CAN ACCEPT ONE
VARIANT OF THIS OPTION. JORDAN MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO
BUY IT IF SOME CONDITIONS SUCH AS THE SUPPORT OF THE
U.S. FOR A PARTICULAR OUTCOME AND GENERAL ARAB
(EGYPT, SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA) NON-OBJECTION TO IT
WERE OBTAINED.

6. THE METAMORPHIC OPTION: THIS IMPLIES THAT THE
PLO ITSELF COULD COME, BUT ONLY AFTER SOME RATHER
DRASTIC CHANGE IN ITS IDEAS AND REPRESENTATION.
IT MIGHT MEAN THUS THE INTRODUCTION OF PALESTINIANS
FROM AREAS AND GROUPS ONLY REMOTELY ASSOCIATED WITH
THE PLO AS A WAY OF BEGINNING TO MAKE THE CHANGE.
THE APPLICATION OF PRESSURE AND HEAT MIGHT BE REQUIRED
TO MAKE THE CHANGE. IN PART IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE
TO CONCEIVE OF IT AS INTRODUCING MEMBERS OF SAIQA
UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL, KNOWN PLO MODERATES AND OTHERS
IN AN ATTEMPT THROUGH PERSONALITIES, RATHER THAN
DOCTRINE, TO CHANGE THE COMPLEXION OF THE PLO.
(FIGURES SUCH AS RELATIVE PLO MODERATES LIKE
WALID KHALDI OR PLO SYMPATHIZERS LIKE ARAB BANK
PRESIDENT SHOMAN COME TO MIND.) THE INDIVIDUALS
WOULD PROBABLY COME TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH ANOTHER
ARAB DELEGATION OR BLENDED INTO A UNIFIED ARAB GROUP.
THE COMPLEXION OF SUCH A GROUP, I.E., PLO MODERATES
OR OUTSIDERS, WOULD HELP TO DETERMINE WHETHER AND AT
WHAT PRICE IT COULD BE INTRODUCED INTO THE PROCEEDINGS
WHILE STILL RETAINING ISRAELI PARTICIPATION. ON THE
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DOCTRINAL SIDE, ACCEPTANCE OF PRE-JUNE 1967 ISRAEL
AND 242/338 WOULD BE THE LIKELY MINIMUM CHANGE
NEEDED. IT SEEMS LIKELY ALSO FOR ANY SUCH SOLUTION
TO EVOLVE, THAT TIME AND THE LEADERSHIP TO WORK CHANGES
OF THE MAJOR ARAB STATES WOULD BE REQUIRED.

7. ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN: INHERENT IN MOST OF
THESE HEAVILY PROCEDURAL ALTERNATIVES IS THE QUESTION
OF LINKS WITH OR ASSOCIATION BETWEEN JORDAN
AND THE PALESTINIANS. THE PLO VIEW APPEARS TO BE
THAT THIS CAN COME ONLY AFTER AN INDEPENDENT STATE
IS SET UP. THE JORDANIAN VIEW IS THAT THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE THEMSELVES SHOULD IN AN ACT OF SELF-DETERMINA-
TION DECIDE THIS POINT. THE REALITY WILL BE THAT
IF NEGOTIATIONS REALLY GET STARTED, THE ISARELIS
WILL INSIST ON NEGOTIATING THE CHARACTER OF WHAT

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EMERGES ON THE WEST BANK IN EXCRUCIATING DETAIL, INCLUDING CHARACTER OF LEADERSHIP AND ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN. THE BEGIN-DAYAN FUNCTIONAL PROPOSAL IS AN EARLY REFLECTION OF THIS POINT. INDEED PUTTING THE PALESTINIANS INTO OR WITH A JORDANIAN DELEGATION OR A JORDANIAN-ISRAELI WORKING GROUP ON WEST BANK SEEMS THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY TO ADVANCE THE ISSUE. U.S. LEVERAGE FOR DOING THIS IS NOT UNLIMITED, BUT IS NOT INCONSIDERABLE. (SEE PARA 9) THE ARABS ARE WAITING FOR US TO TAKE A LEAD. THE OPTIONS IN THIS CABLE AND OTHERS WHICH WE HAVE NOT THOUGHT OF, MIGHT BE THE BASIS FOR SUCH AN APPROACH. COMBINATIONS OF THESE OPTIONS ARE DEFINITELY POSSIBLE.

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

8. CONCLUSION:
(A) THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE REPRESENTED IN SOME WAY AT GENEVA;
(B) TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL PROGRESS THIS MUST BE DONE IN SOME FORM OF ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN;
(C) ALL THINGS BEING RELATIVELY EQUAL, WE SHOULD TRY TO FORM AN ARAB CONSENSUS OVER WHICH FORM OF REPRESENTATION THE ARABS WOULD PREFER TO SUPPORT AND WHICH THEY WOULD TRY TO SELL TO THE PLO AND OTHER PALESTINIAN GROUPS--I.E., PROXY, METAMORPHISED PLO, OR SURROGATE GROUP;
(E) WE WILL HAVE TO PLAY THE KEY ROLE WITH ISRAEL AS WELL AS WITH THE ARABS AND SHOULD EXAMINE WHICH OF THESE APPROACHES OR OTHER POSSIBLE COM-

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BINATIONS WE COULD PROCEED WITH;
(E) WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE JORDAN
A CANDID DESCRIPTION OF OUR OBJECTIVES AND A CLEAR
COMMITMENT ON OUR INTENTIONS IN ORDER TO SECURE
ITS COOPERATION. WE SHOULD EXPECT THE JORDANIANS TO
MAKE MORE CLEAR THAN THEY HAVE WHAT THEY WANT FROM
US IN THIS PROCESS, AND HOW THEY SEE "SELF-
DETERMINATION" BEING REALISTICALLY FACTORED INTO
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THE PROCESS.
(F) WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL ABOUT SETTING TIME
DEADLINES IN THIS PROCESS FOR A GENEVA MEETING
WHICH, IF NOT MET, WILL FRUSTRATE AND DISCOURAGE
THE PARTIES OVER OUR ROLE AND CAPACITY TO PERFORM.
(G) IN TERMS OF EASE OF GETTING THE ISRAELIS
TO THE TABLE, THE CHOICES ARE PERHAPS 1) THE
SURROGATE OPTION, FOLLOWED BY 2) THE PROXY AND THEN
3) THE CHANGED PLO. WE ASSUME THE SURROGATE
AND PROXY PROCESS COULD POSSIBLY ALSO HELP TO META-
MORPHOSE--OR SUPPLANT--THE PLO MORE EFFECTIVELY
THAN HERETOFORE HAS BEEN POSSIBLE. ARAB PERCEPTIONS
ARE HARD TO DESCRIBE. FOR THE JORDANIANS, BUT NOT
POSSIBLY THE OTHER ARABS, THE SURROGATE WOULD ALSO
BE THE EASIEST.

9. RELATED QUESTIONS: WE BELIEVE THAT THIS ISSUE
IS NOT THE ONLY ONE OF SIGNIFICANCE WHICH WE FACE
IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROBLEM OF GETTING TO GENEVA.
WHILE IT IS INCONCEIVABLE TO HOPE, AS SOME (INCLUDING
HUSSEIN AT TIMES) HAVE EXPRESSED IT, THAT ALL MAJOR
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED BEFORE GOING TO
GENEVA, A CERTAIN NUMBER OF QUESTIONS OF A PROCEDURAL
CHARACTER, BUT WITH POLITICAL CONTENT MUST BE WORKED
OUT. THE PRESSURES OF THE CONFERENCE ITSELF CAN
HELP IN WORKING OUT OTHERS AND THE STRONG INTERESTS IN
GETTING THERE ESPECIALLY ON THE PART OF SOME OF THE
ARABS WILL ALSO HELP. IN ADDITION, THERE IS THE
FURTHER U.S. LEVERAGE ON THE QUESTION THAT TO THE
DEGREE WE TRY TO HELP THE ARABS ON PLO PRESENCE AT
GENEVA, TO THAT SAME DEGREE WE EXPEND POLITICAL
CAPITAL WITH THE ISRAELIS USABLE ALTERNATIVELY ON
SUCH ISSUES AS A TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT IN THEIR
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INTEREST. FINALLY, THE ARABS ARE ALREADY CONSCIOUS

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OF THE FACT THAT THE ADDITION OF A PARTY TO THE PROCESS, SUCH AS THE PLO, WHICH BASICALLY REJECTS A SETTLEMENT IN THE PRESENT FRAMEWORK (242/338) WILL NOT MAKE NEGOTIATIONS FOR EGYPT AND SYRIA ON THE RECOVERY OF THEIR OWN TERRITORY ANY EASIER.

10. RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT PASS BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, JIDDA, TEL AVIV FOR COMMENT. PICKERING

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Subject: PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AND JORDAN
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